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Abstract—By the performance analysis of two protocols 
AODV and USOR implemented in ns2 we made a 
comparison between them. USOR is efficient as it uses a 
novel combination of group signature and ID-based 
encryption for route discovery. Security analysis 
demonstrates that USOR can well protect user privacy 
against both inside and outside attackers. Successful 
implementation of unlinkability and unobservability property 
of USOR not only has satisfactory performance compared to 
AODV, but also achieves stronger privacy protection than 
the existing systems when in the malicious environment. 
Usage of the stronger encryption techniques in unobservable 
protocol makes the more data secure. In this paper we are 
going to compare the protocols AODV and USOR. The 
performance of the network mainly refers by using the 
packet delivery function and the over head of the packet to 
reach the destination. Here we are analyze overhead and 
packet delivery function of the two protocols and made the 
comparison between them. 
Keywords— USOR, AODV, ns2. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays wireless mobile nodes are becoming more and 
more capable and have improved a lot over those available in 
the past. In Ad hoc networks all the wireless mobile devices 
will be capable to communicate with each other in the 
absence of infrastructure. Ad hoc network allows all wireless 
devices within range of each other without involving any 
central access point and administration. Routing protocols 
are challenging to design as performance degrades with the 
growth of number of nodes in the environment and a large ad 
hoc network is difficult to manage, and there are more 
number of chances to attack by the hackers. So the main 
problem in the MANET[1] is providing the security to the all 
part of the network. To avoid security problems there are so 
many researchers invented many security methods like 
encryption methods, secure routing protocols. In our project 
we are going to compare the two protocols AODV[2] and 
USOR[3]. In AODV routes are discovered as on-demand 
basis and are maintained as long as they are required, and it 
maintains a sequence number, which it increases each time it 
finds a change in the topology of its neighborhood. This 
sequence number ensures that the most recent route is 
selected for execution of the route discovery. AODV is able 
to provide uncast, multicast and broadcast communication 
ability. Combination of the three makes it an advantage 
protocol. Route tables used by AODV store the destination 
and next hop IP addresses as well as the destination sequence 
number. AODV also provide quick deletion of invalid routes 
in response the route ERROR messages generated due to 
link breakage. If a node fails to receive three consecutive 
HELLO messages from a neighbor, it is concluded that link 
is broken for the specific node and a RERR message is 
broadcasted to any upstream node. In fact a more 
conservative routing table and sequence number driven 
approach is utilized in AODV. AODV is best in routing 
procedure but in the case of security providing to the node 
and data transmission there are some faults occurred. AODV 
failed to provide the secure data transmission. For this An 
Unobservable Secure On-Demand Routing is introduced. 
This unobservable secure routing scheme offers complete 
unlink ability and content un-observability[4]. USOR is 
efficient as it uses a novel combination of group signature 
and ID-based encryption for route finding. To improve 
security here we are using popular two methods, one is RSA 
algorithm[5] and Sha-1 algorithm[6]. In this project we 
suggested un-observability by providing protection on 
request and reply. Security analysis demonstrates that USOR 
can well protect user privacy against both inside and outside 
attackers. In this paper we are going to compare the both the 
protocols AODV and USOR with the hacking environment. 
Comparison is done by the over head and packet delivery 
functions of the both protocols. 
 
II. ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol: 
Ad-hoc On-demand distance vector routing protocol 
(AODV)[7,8] is a reactive routing protocol. In AODV, the 
network is silent until a connection is needed. At that point 
the network node that needs a connection broadcasts a 
request for connection. Other AODV nodes forward this 
message, and record the node that they heard it from, 
creating an explosion of temporary routes back to the needy 
node. When a node receives such a message and already has 
a route to the desired node, it sends a message backwards 
through a temporary route to the requesting node. The needy 
node then begins using the route that has the least number of 
hops through other nodes. Unused entries in the routing 
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tables are recycled after a time. When a link fails, a routing 
error is passed back to a transmitting node, and the process 
repeats. Nodes uses sequence number so that they do not 
repeat route requests that they have already passed on. The 
basic operation of AODV includes the two main steps-  
1. Path Discovery  
2. Path Maintenance.  
1. Path Discovery: 
The Path Discovery process is initiated whenever a 
source node wants to transmit data to the destination and it 
has no valid routing information. Here, each node maintains 
two separate counters. < node sequence number and 
broadcast id >  The sequence number is to determine the 
freshest route in the network. Broadcast id is initiated by the 
source node and it is incremented when broadcast starts from 
the node. The source node initiates path discovery by 
broadcasting a route request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors. 
Figure 1 represents the flow of RREQ in the network from 
source to the destination node. The contents of RREQ packet 
are: <Source IP address, source sequence number, broadcast 
id, destination IP address, destination sequence number, hop 
count> The pair < source IP address, broadcast id> uniquely 
identifies a RREQ. Whenever a node receives multiple 
copies of RREQ from the different intermediate nodes, it 
keeps the first RREQ packet and ignores all other RREQs. 
The intermediate node can reply to the source node if it has a 
route to the destination with equal or greater sequence 
number than the destination sequence number in the RREQ 
packet. 
 
Fig.1: Route Request propagation 
 
The routing path can be established in two steps- reverse 
path set up and forward path setup. The reverse path is 
established with the propagation of the route reply packets 
(RREP) in the network from the destination to the source 
node. When the RREQ is sent in the network, the 
intermediate nodes forward the RREQ after increasing the 
number of hops in the RREQ packet by one and also they 
record the address of the node from which they receive the 
first RREQ packet. Once the RREQ is reached at the 
destination node, the eligible intermediate nodes as well as 
the destination node propagate RREP from the destination to 
the source. Once the RREP reaches the source node, it 
establishes the reverse path. Figure 2 shows the propagation 
of RREP in the network from destination to the source node. 
The content of RREP is: <Destination IP address, source IP 
address, number of hops, expiration time, destination 
sequence number> The reverse path routing information is 
maintained only till the reverse path is established and this 
duration is represented by the expiration time.  Once the 
reverse path is established, the forward path is established by 
the means of RREP propagation as the intermediate nodes 
record the address of the previous nodes in reverse path from 
destination to source node in a similar manner as the reverse 
path setup. 
 
Fig.2: Route Reply 
 
2. Path Maintenance:  
The route from source node to destination is affected by the 
movement of active nodes lying on that path. If the source 
node moves during an active session, it can reinitiate the 
route discovery procedure. On the other hand, when the 
destination or some intermediate node moves, the 
communication link fails. So, to handle the link failure 
problem, the node that detects unreachable node or broken 
link, sets infinity as number of hops in RREP and also attach 
the link failure notification message (RERR) to each of its 
active upstream neighbor on underlying path. Once RERR 
reaches the source, it reinitiates the route discovery 
procedure. Local connectivity among the nodes can be 
maintained with the help of periodic broadcasting of HELLO 
messages but this increases traffic overhead in the network. 
Advantage of AODV is routes are established on demand 
and destination sequence numbers are used to find the latest 
route to the destination. Lower delay for connection setup, 
Disadvantage is, it doesn’t allow handling unidirectional 
links. Multiple Route Reply packets in response to a single 
Route Request packet can lead to heavy control overhead. 
Periodic beaconing leads to unnecessary bandwidth 
consumption. 
Unobservable Secure On-Demand Routing 
Protocol[9,10]: 
A number of schemes have been proposed to protect privacy 
in ad hoc networks. However, none of these schemes offer 
complete unlinkability or unobservability property since data 
packets and control packets are still linkable and 
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distinguishable in these schemes. This provides stronger 
privacy requirements regarding privacy-preserving routing in 
mobile ad hoc networks. SOR is efficient as it uses a novel 
combination of group signature and ID-based encryption for 
route discovery. Security analysis demonstrates that USOR 
can well protect user privacy against both inside and outside 
attackers.  
In this protocol, both control packets and data packets look 
random and indistinguishable from dummy packets for 
outside adversaries. Only valid nodes can distinguish routing 
packets and data packets from dummy traffic with 
inexpensive symmetric decryption. The intuition behind the 
proposed scheme is that if a node can establish a key with 
each of its neighbors, then it can use such a key to encrypt 
the whole packet for a corresponding neighbor. The 
receiving neighbor can distinguish whether the encrypted 
packet is intended for itself by trial decryption. In order to 
support both broadcast and unicast, a group key and a 
pairwise key are needed. As a result, USOR comprises two 
phases: anonymous trust establishment and unobservable 
route discovery. The unobservable routing scheme USOR 
aims to offer the following privacy properties. 
Anonymity: the senders, receivers, and intermediate nodes 
are not identifiable within the whole network, the largest 
anonymity set. 
Unlinkability: the linkage between any two or more IOIs 
from the senders, the receivers, the intermediate nodes, and 
the messages is protected from outsiders. Note linkage 
between any two messages, e.g., whether they are from the 
same source node, is also protected. 
Unobservability: any meaningful packet in the routing 
scheme is indistinguishable from other packets to an outside 
attacker. Not only are the content of the packet but also the 
packet header like packet type protected from eavesdroppers. 
And any node involved in route discovery or packet 
forwarding, including the source node, destination node, and 
any intermediate node, is not aware of the identity of other 
involved nodes (also including the source node, the 
destination node, or any other intermediate nodes). 
The unobservable routing scheme comprises of two phases: 
anonymous key establishment as the first phase and the route 
discovery process as the second phase. 
1) Anonymous Key Establishment: In this phase, every node 
in the ad hoc network communicates with its direct 
neighbors within its radio range for anonymous key 
establishment. 
2) Privacy-Preserving Route Discovery: This phase is a 
privacy-preserving route discovery process based on the 
keys established in previous phase. Similar to normal route 
discovery process, our discovery process also comprises of 
route request and route reply. The route request messages 
flood throughout the whole network, while the route reply 
messages are sent backward to the source node only. 
Suppose there is a node S (source) intending to find a route 
to a node D (destination), and S knows the identity of the 
destination node D. Without loss of generality, we assume 
three intermediate nodes between S and D, as illustrated in 
Fig. 3. The route discovery process executes as follows: 
Route Request (RREQ): S chooses a random number rS, 
and uses the identity of node D to encrypt a trapdoor 
information that only can be opened with D’s private 
Idbased key, which yields ED(S,D, rSP). S then selects a 
sequence number seqno for this route request, and another 
random number NS as the route pseudonym, which is used as 
the index to a specific route entry. To achieve 
unobservability, S chooses a nonce NonceS and calculates a 
pseudonym as NymS=H3(kS∗|NonceS). Each node also 
maintains a temporary entry in his routing table seqno, Prev 
RNym, Next RNym, Prev hop,Nexthop, where seqno is the 
route request sequence number, Prev Rnym denotes the route 
pseudonym of previous hop, Next RNym is the route 
pseudonym of next hop, Prev hop is the upstream node and 
Next hop is the downstream node along the route. As any 
node does not know the real identity of its upstream or 
downstream node. 
entry maintained by S temporarily is (seqno,−,NS,−).After 
that, S encrypts these items using its local broadcast key kS∗ 
to obtain EkS∗ (RREQ,NS,ED(S,D, rSP)). Finally, S 
broadcast the following unobservable route request to its 
neighbors: 
NonceS,NymS,EkS(RREQ,NS,ED(S,D,rSP),seqno) 
Upon receiving the route request message from S, A 
tries all his session keys shared with all neighbors to 
calculate H3(kX|NonceS) or H3(kXA|NonceS) to see which 
one matches the received NymS. Then A would find out kS∗ 
satisfies NymS = H3(kS|NonceS), so he uses kS∗ to decrypt 
the ciphertext. After finding out this is a route request 
packet, A tries to decrypt ED(S,D, rSP) using his private 
Idbased key to see whether A is the destination node. To 
avoid RREQ broadcasting storm, A will check if he has 
received the same request before by looking up in his cache, 
which includes a list of NS and seqno. If it is not a duplicate 
RREQ, A caches NS and seqno for a given time to detect 
multiple receipt of the same RREQ packet. In this example, 
A is not the destination and his trial fails, so he acts as an 
intermediate node. A generates a nonce NonceA and a new 
route pseudonym NA for this route. He then calculates a 
pseudonym NymA = H3(kA∗|NonceA). He also records the 
route pseudonyms and sequence number in his routing table 
for purpose of routing, and the corresponding table entry he 
maintained is (seqno,NS,NA, S, −). At the end, A prepares 
and broadcast the following message to all its neighbors: 
NonceA,NymA,EkA(RREQ,NA,ED(S,D,rSP),seqno) 
Other intermediate nodes do the same as A does. Finally, the 
destination node D receives the following message from C: 
NonceC,NymC,EkC(RREQ,NC,ED(S,D,rSP),seqno 
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Fig.3: Route Request USOR 
 
Likewise, D finds out the correct key kC according to the 
equation NymC = H3(kC∗|NonceC). After decrypting the 
ciphertext using kC∗, D records route pseudonyms and the 
sequence number into his route table. Then D successfully 
decrypts ED(S,D, rSP) to find out he is the destination node. 
D may receive more than one route request messages that 
originate from the same source and have the same 
destination D, but he just replies to the first arrived message 
and drops the following ones. The route table entry recorded 
by D is (seqno,NC,−, C, −). 
Route Reply (RREP): After node D finds out he is the 
destination node, he starts to prepare a reply message to the 
source node. For route reply messages, unicast instead of 
broadcast is used to save communication cost. D chooses a 
random number rD and computes a ciphertext ES(D, S, rSP, 
rDP) showing that he is the valid destination capable of 
opening the trapdoor information. A session key kSD = 
H2(rSrDP|S|D) is computed for data protection. Then he 
generates a new pairwise pseudonym NymCD = 
H3(kCD|NonceD) between C and him. At the end, using the 
pairwise session key kCD, he computes and sends the 
following message to C:  
 
NonceD,NymCD,EkCD(RREP,NC,ES(D,S,rSP, rDP),seqno) 
 
When C receives the above message from D, he identifies 
who the sender of the message is by evaluating the equation 
NymCD = H3(kCD|NonceD). So he uses the right key kCD 
to decrypts the ciphertext, then he finds out which route this 
RREP is related to according to the route pseudonym NC 
and seqno. C then searches his route table and modifies the 
temporary entry (seqno,NB,NC,B, −) into 
(seqno,NB,NC,B,D). At the end, C chooses a new nonce 
NonceC, computes NymBC = H3(kBC|NonceC), and sends 
the following message to B:  
 
NonceC,NymBC,EkBC(RREP,NB,ES(D,S,rSP,rDP), 
seqno).(5) 
 
Other intermediate nodes perform the same operations as C 
does. Finally, the following route reply is sent back to the 
source node S by A in our example illustrated in the Fig. 4: 
NonceA,NymSA,EkSA(RREP,NS,ES(D,S,rSP, rDP), seqno). 
(6) 
 
 
Fig.4: Route Reply USOR 
 
S decrypts the ciphertext using the right key kSA and verifies 
that ES(D, S, rSP, rDP) is composed faultlessly. Now S is 
ensured that D has successfully opened the route request 
packet, and the route reply is really originated from the 
destination node D. S also computes the same session key 
kSD = H2(rSrDP|S|D) as D does. Till now, S has 
successfully found a route to the destination node D, and the 
route discovery process is finished with success. S then finds 
and modifies his temporary route table entry 
(seqno,−,NS,−,−) into (seqno,−,NS,−,A). 
3) Unobservable Data Packet Transmission: After the 
source node S successfully finds out a route to the 
destination node D, S can start unobservable data 
transmission under the protection of pseudonyms and keys. 
As illustrated in Fig. 5, data packets from S must traverse A, 
B, and C to reach D. The data packets sent by S take the 
following format (DATA denotes the packet type): 
 
NonceS,NymSA,EkSA(DATA,NS,seqno,EkSD(payload)).(7) 
 
Upon receiving the above message from S, A knows that this 
message is for him according to the pseudonym NymSA. 
After decryption using the right key, A knows this message 
is a data packet and should be forwarded to B according to 
route pseudonym NS. Hence he composes and forwards the 
following packet to B: 
 
NonceA,NymAB,EkAB(DATA,NA,seqno,EkSD(payload)). (8) 
 
The data packet is further forwarded by other intermediate 
nodes until it reaches the destination node D. At the end, the 
following data packet is received by D: 
NonceC,NymCD,EkCD(DATA,NC,seqno,EkSD(payload)). 
(9) 
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Fig.5: Data Transmission USOR 
 
SHA algorithm and the RSA algorithm is used to encrypt the 
data. In this routing all the part of the route is maintained 
secretly like all sequence number, source ID, Destination ID, 
Packet etc, and this means to provide the good security 
environment in the routing even in the malicious 
environment.  
 
III. COMPARISON OF THE PROTOCOLS 
Network performance refers to the service quality of a 
communications product as seen by the customer. There are 
many different ways to measure the performance of a 
network, as each network is different in nature and design. 
The performance of the network mainly refers by using the 
packet delivery function and the over head of the packet to 
reach the destination.  
1. Packet delivery function: PDF is the term used to 
measure the network performance. PDF defines the how 
much amount of packet data delivered to the destination 
correctly over total number of packets sent by the source. 
Here we are going to analyze the total number of packets 
that are delivered to the destination. PDF can be graphed by 
using the xgraph. First of all calculating the total number of 
packets deliver to the destination according with the time. So 
finally we can measure the 10 values and form a graph in the 
both the routing protocols AODV and USOR. By comparing 
the two protocols we can analyze the best performance of the 
protocol.\ 
2. Overhead: Overhead is the one important concept to 
analyze network performance. Overhead is defined as 
number of routing and control packet is requiring 
transferring the data. 
 
IV. RESULT 
In this paper we analyzed the AODV and USOR with the 
malicious environments with main network parameters such 
as packet delivery radio and overhead. Result shown below 
is packet delivery function. In that graph, there are the two 
environments (AODV with malicious environment and 
USOR with malicious environment) shown in Figure: 6 and 
Figure: 7 show the bar chart of overhead. 
 
Fig.6: X-graph-overhead comparisons of AODV and USOR 
 
 
Fig.7: Bar chart-overhead comparisons of AODV and USOR 
 
In the above graph and bar chart shows the overhead of the 
AODV and the USOR. Blue color lines denoted the AODV 
and the red color lines denoted the USOR. The overhead of 
the AODV with the malicious environment is greater than 
the overhead of USOR with the malicious environment. 
USOR performance is better than normal AODV even 
overhead is more; the reason is security of USOR is very 
high so overhead is ignorable in this case. 
The packet delivery function of the both the protocols are 
shown in figure 7, 8. Here the packet delivery function of the 
AODV is blue in color and it is give some packet deliver up 
to some extend and was stop the packet delivery due to the 
hacking environment. Malicious node could not pass the 
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packet to the destination by the way the packet delivery is 
minute.  In the USOR that is denoted by the red in color, it 
has more packet delivery at peak level that is the route 
request and response packets in between the source and 
destination. Afterwards the packet deliver is in continuous 
up to the communication ends. So the packet delivery 
function of the USOR is more effective than in the AODV. 
By the way USOR provides the secure data communication 
even in the malicious environment. 
 
Fig.7: x-Graph-PDF comparisons of AODV and USOR 
 
 
Fig.8: Bar chart-PDF comparisons of AODV and USOR 
 
USOR provides the strong security requirements to the route 
and the data that is transfer to the source to destination. 
Strong security is attained by the unlinkability, 
unobsevability, secure algorithms RSA, SHA. The 
unobsevability is kept the all the part of the packet and route 
information secretly that is source id, destination id, 
sequence number, packet id etc. this information is kept 
secret and will known by only the destination when routing 
process. Secure encryption and decryption algorithms RSA 
and SHA provide the strong privacy to the information that 
no one can decrypt the data except destination. Finally the 
USOR results the strong privacy in routing and information 
in between the source and destination in mobile ad hoc 
networks. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we suggested an unobservable routing protocol 
USOR based on group signature and ID-based cryptosystem 
for ad hoc networks. The conception of USOR offers solid 
privacy protection complete unlinkability and content 
unobservability for ad hoc networks. The protection analysis 
demonstrates that USOR not only provides strong privacy 
protection, it is also more resistant against attacks due to 
node compromise. By the way USOR has satisfactory 
performance in terms of packet delivery ratio, latency and 
normalized control bytes than the AODV with malicious 
environment. 
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